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Bekdamyrova
Lidiia Zaurivna

Peculiarities of identity policy implementation in ethnic and political regulation processes in Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary and Romania as example)

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Bekdamyrova Lidiia Zaurivna
Postgraduate Student at the Department of General and Political Science of Zaporizhzhya Polytechnic National University
Zhukovskiy str., 64, Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine

Central and Eastern Europe countries' experience in regulating ethnic and political processes and conflicts is important in terms of defining the prospects for development of these countries, as well as, in terms of critical reflection and their experience usage by Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. It should be noted that not all reviewed experience is positive and not all methods of regulating ethnic and-political processes can be adapted to the Ukrainian conditions. However, some approaches and practices, including certain elements of identity politics, minority policies, memory, language, symbolic policies with certain correlations and changes, can also be applied in our country. In addition, Ukraine's foreign policy needs to pay attention to the specificities of identity and memory policies implemented in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, since these features have had a significant impact on the internal and external policies of these countries, including the relations between each of these states and Ukraine.

The article examines the experience of regulating ethnic and political processes on the example of two countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They are Hungary and Romania. This country's choice is applied first and foremost due to the fact that these post-socialist countries, which have recently become EU countries. It represents the diversity of characters and typological examples of the identity implementation, memory, language, symbolic policy, and policy to national minorities, provided by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Each of the concerned countries has its own distinctive character in the field of international relations, and this specific feature significantly differentiates them from the countries of Western Europe. At the same time, despite the significant differences in the regulation of ethnic, political, and ethno social processes, some areas of national and identity policies in them have a similar trajectory. In this regard, it is important to describe the particularities of ethnic and political processes in nation creation, identity and minority policies in Hungary and Romania, to analyze the role of World War II in the politics of historical memory and the symbolic politics of the CEE countries.

Key words: *identity policy, ethnic and political processes, international relations, nation creation, ethnic and political contradictions.*

Formulation of the problem. There is a marked discrepancy between the legal norms, adopted and declared at the level of supranational structures of the EU, and the actual practice of treating national minorities, memory and identity policies in each of Central and Eastern European countries. The main problem is the significant differences between the ethnic and political situation in the countries of Western Europe, on one hand, and in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the other. These differences are due not only to different histories, but also to different social, economic, and geopolitical positions of Western and Eastern European societies. In Western Europe countries, the nation formation and the state creation occurred more or less simultaneously or interconnected. Then in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in many cases the nation-formation either slowed down from the state formation and its institutions, or occurred with numerous deviations caused by the influence of internal and foreign policy factors. At the same time,

the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including considered Hungary and Romania, have been a part of various state entities and political alliances throughout their history, gaining state independence much later than Western European countries.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the peculiarities of the implementation of identity policy in the settlement of ethnopolitical processes in Central and Eastern Europe on the example of Hungary and Romania, using the experience of Ukraine.

The paper uses a comparative analysis of the identity policies of the two countries of Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary and Romania.

Hungary and its Minority and Memory Policies

In the socialist period, Hungary, along with the GDR, had the highest standard of living among the Warsaw Pact countries. In the public consciousness of Hungary Nostalgia for the time of Yadar Kadar's reign is present. Back then, Hungarian agricultural products were widely known outside the country, giving the country a steady income. In 1989, reforms

were launched to reduce public participation in the economy and expand the private sector with the beginning of the socialist system dismantling. In addition, significant foreign investment was attracted. Politically, these processes were accompanied by the expansion of Hungary's involvement into European integration and the country's accession to the European Union in 2004.

Before the crisis of 2008, the economic and social situation in Hungary was distinguished by two trends. On one hand, because of privatization and inflow of foreign capital, economic growth has become too progressive. On the other hand, this increase was accompanied by a budget deficit, a reduction in social payments and a reformatting of the labor market, which markedly affected the social situation of the majority of the population, in particular, at the level of unemployment and, as a consequence, in the public sentiments. At the beginning of crisis in 2008, a sharp recession was marked in the Hungarian economy that went into big recession, the consequences of which the country is still experiencing. This contributed to a significant strengthening of the position of right-oriented Conservatives. And the party, expressing their interests, "Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union", eventually became the leading party of Hungary.

Such a complex and ambiguous social and political situation could not, but affect the position of national minorities. It is the area, where the layers and interpenetrations of a number of discourses have occurred. It should be started with the fact that under socialism, the very concept of "minority" is especially applicable to interethnic relations that have not been actualized or conceptualized. The problem of national minority policy making occurred in all post-socialist countries, but the case with Hungary stands out because it is essentially a mono-ethnic country. The Hungarians make from 90 to 95% of the population, according to various sources. In this regard, Hungary has historically been perceived as internally and externally as a "Hungarian state" [1, p. 35]. On the other hand, an important point is the asymmetry of the modern Hungarian state and the Hungarian nation in the sense that the Hungarian nation is understood in Budapest. As it is well known from Hungary's foreign policy program, which has been announced in the early 1990s, protecting of the rights of ethnic Hungarians, who find themselves in neighboring states because of historical circumstances [2, p. 1118]. Consequently, the term "Diaspora" is not generally used in official rhetoric.

Such a situation markedly hampered the actual implementation of pan-European legal norms, especially the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, adopted in 1995 and in force in 1998. Formally, a special body for national and ethnic minorities (now a unit within the Department of National and Ethnic Minorities

and national politics) was organized in Hungary as early as 1990. The official status of minorities was granted to 14 ethnic groups.

Three years later, in 1993, an Act on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, which was updated in 2005, was introduced in Hungary. It gave a specific, "localized" interpretation of the national minority and its surrounding legal field. Let us turn to the typical example. The preamble to the Framework Convention contains the concept of "national minority", but its content is not disclosed.

Further, a rather vague formula is represented, which states that "the protection of national minorities and the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to these minorities is an integral part of international human rights protection". It is Section 1, Article 1 of the Convention. In the Hungarian Act, on the contrary, the meaning of the term "national minority" is spelled out quite clearly. It refers to "an ethnic group that has lived on the territory of the Republic of Hungary for at least one hundred years. It is a large minority of the citizens of a state, who represent Hungarian citizens. They differ from others in their language, culture, and traditions" It is Section 1 of Art. of Act 1.

According to the Convention, the parties, which ratified it, are prescribed "to encourage the creation of favorable conditions. These conditions must enable persons, belonging to national minorities, to support and develop their culture and to preserve the basic elements of identity, namely religion, language, traditions, and cultural heritage". It is Section 1, Article 5 of the Convention. In the case of Hungary, the emphasis is somewhat different. The state should take measures "against political intentions" that can lead to the assimilation, segregation, persecution or complication of the rights of national or ethnic minorities through their status. It is stated in Section 1 of Article 4 of the Act. In addition, according to the Act, "the preservation, favorability, consolidation, and continuity of minority identity" is a mandatory collective right of the minority itself as Section 3 of Article 17 declared, but further nothing is stated about the role of the state in this "conservation and consolidation".

In practice, it is reflected in a variety of trends. The relations between the state and the title nation towards minorities at the state level are rather benevolent, but it has rather passive and assimilative character. There may be a gradual erosion of the ethnic and cultural identity of minorities at this background. Thus, studies conducted among the local Slovaks showed that only 66% of those polled people considered themselves as minority. Only 22% of those polled people call themselves the Hungarians of Slovak origin. Moreover, 12% of them are really the Hungarians. At the same time, more than 40% of the respondents speak only Hungarian. Only elderly people use Slovak

language [3, p. 338]. As experts state it, the Slovak minority view the integration into the Hungarian community as the way of preserving their own identity and friendly coexistence. The Hungarians do not show this counter-interest, which means that the chances of effectively maintaining their Slovak identity are “too small”.

The most problematic situation in Hungary is probably the situation with the Gypsy's minority. The share of Gypsies in the population of Hungary is reported to be about 6–8%, considering them the largest minority in the country [3, p. 338]. The Gypsy's community faces numerous challenges. Firstly, it is not homogeneous, either socially or ethnically. The Gypsy's community of Hungary is rather a conglomerate of ethnic and cultural communities. They are assimilated at various degrees. They speak different Gypsy dialects or in general, they abandoned the Gypsy in favor from the Hungarian language. Secondly, half of the Roma live in rural areas, often in isolated areas, without equal access to education and social protection, and as a result are uncompetitive. Thirdly, the vast majority of Hungarians are reluctant to settle in areas with many Gypsies, including cities, citing criminogenic, poor living conditions. This causes considerable difficulties for the real and not declared integration of the Roma

The Strategy for the Inclusion of Gypsies in Hungarian Society was launched in 2007. It is carried out with the support of grassroots administration and various non-profit organizations. It has two main objectives: the eradication of poverty and the expansion of social and political participation of representatives of the Gypsy community. This program is also supported by supranational structures, including the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund. According to experts, the results of this initiative appear to be quite controversial. For example, if the overall housing situation has improved significantly in the city and in the countryside, then education has not yet been progressive due to the inconsistent actions of the local authorities and, last but not least, the resistance of the locals [4, p. 352], for whom the Gypsies are still acting ethnic couples.

Thus, we can say that in Hungary there is still a historically determined ethnic approach to understanding the nation. It cannot be said that there are no practices for regulating the status of communities belonging to national minorities in the country: on the contrary, at the local level, the state provides them with space for self-organizing and realizing their ethno-cultural identity (including through political representation and the media). However, the relation of the titular nation to national minorities should rather be characterized as passive, which follows from the thought of the inevitable ultimate ungarisation of the latter. It is noteworthy that

the Constitution of the country does not say anything about national or ethnic minorities.

It has been already noted that much more political leadership of Hungary is the correlation of communities of “foreign” Hungarians with the current Hungarian state. In this case, shared historical memory becomes a tool for social communication and the creation of a single cultural field, which is visualized with the help of monuments and historical sites in order to give the past powerful and powerful influence.

The current memory policy in Hungary is constructed around two pivotal narratives. The myth of historical heritage, so-called grandeur and the discourse of denial of totalitarian heritage. Both narratives, in combination or separately, are characteristic of most post-socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe, and in the Hungarian case, they only acquire local specificity. In the first case, the Trianon Museums (locally defined by the Treaty of Trianon of 1920 defining the borders of Hungary after the First World War), which are intended to remind of the “unfair” division of the Hungarians, are at the local level.

The denial of totalitarianism works in two directions. On the one hand, this is a distance from the Soviet past. Yes, back in 1993, the “Memento” Park was organized in Budapest, which became a kind of reservation for objects of monumental propaganda of the times of Hungarian socialism. In 2002, the Museum of Terrorism was opened in the premises of the State Security Office of Hungary, which has become, arguably, the most iconic “memorial site” not only of Hungary, but also of the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. Along with the condemnation of Stalinist totalitarianism of 1945–1956, the museum exhibits a similar assessment and time of the Nazi occupation of 1944–1945. The last topic was developed in the year of the 70th anniversary of the Holocaust in Hungary. Then, in 2014, a monument was constructed in the center of Budapest to position Hungary as a victim of Nazism, despite the fact that the country was an ally of the Third Reich.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that according to the preamble to the Hungarian Constitution, adopted in April 2011, from March 1944, so-called the beginning of the Nazi occupation, to May 1990, called the first free election; the country was not a constitutional and sovereign state. This ignores the fact that, since 1941, Hungary has been actively fighting on the side of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, and the M. Horthy regime that existed in Hungary prior to the Nazi occupation in 1944 was inherently authoritarian.

In this sense, the current leadership of the country on a symbolic level seems to be moving away from the events in the country during this period and seeks to unite the nation in the framework of “new democracy” and “agreement between the Hungarians of the past,

present, and future". It is also important to note that he cements these discourses as "anti-liberal mobilization of civil society in the field of memory policy". This is directly in line with the story described above, where the blurred provisions of the European Union Framework Convention are replaced by the national-centric wording of the Hungarian Minority Act.

Nation-building and identity politics in Romania

Significant social and economic and interethnic problems are the experience of nation-building, identity and memory policies in post-socialist Romania as a whole can be characterized as quite positive. For example, despite the historically complex and sensitive problem of the Hungarians in Transylvania, which was discussed below, the Romanian state and society, thanks to a flexible and balanced policy towards national minorities, generally manages to support social and interethnic peace.

It should be noted that in an era of change in the early 1990s, Romania entered a state of deep socio-economic crisis that covered all spheres of society. The decline in production, the decline in purchasing power and the standard of living, accompanied by high inflation, continued throughout the next decade. Concerns about the real possibility of political destabilization forced Romania's leadership to centralize power as much as possible. The unitary nature of the state was enshrined in the Constitution of the country, stated in Part 1, Article 1.

According to experts, this step was also a way to avoid open interethnic conflicts. Despite the fact that 89% of the country's population is Romanians, Romania's ethnic palette is diverse: there are 16 minority groups within its territory, socially, economically, and politically integrated into Romanian society [5, p. 243]. At the same time, unlike Hungary, the paragraph on national minorities is present in the Romanian Constitution. In accordance with the European Convention, the Romanian state "guarantees to persons belonging to national minorities the right to preserve, develop, and manifest their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity" It is stated in Part 1, Article 6.

In the 1990s, Romania moved away from a socialist policy of de facto non-recognition of national minorities and made a number of serious steps in the field of securing their rights. In 1997, the Office for the Protection of National Minorities was established. As in Hungary, within the framework of the interaction of specialized agencies and non-profit organizations, programs were developed to preserve the cultural identity of minorities and to increase their socio-political participation. In addition, specific trainings were organized on the interaction of authorities and communities representing national minorities. Subsequently, national minorities were given the opportunity of their own representation in the country's parliament and the use of their languages

in the territorial units, where representatives of this minority made up at least 20% of the population.

The relationship between the titular nation and minorities in Romania directly stems from the ambivalence of the current political discourse. On the one hand, politicians like to turn to populist rhetoric and emphasize the Romanian feature within Europe, which is not least due to the archaic nature of everyday life and the incompleteness of modernization processes. At the same time, it is important for Bucharest to maintain an ethnic balance within the country. In this regard, the Romanian leadership, despite the unitary nature of statehood, is making some concessions to minorities.

Here, however, there is a problem of another kind, namely the «memory conflict» around the same memorial sites and historic territories in representatives of different communities. This is especially striking in the relations between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority. Hungarians make up Romania's largest national minority (more than 1.2 million people, or about 7% of the country's population). For the most part, they reside in Transylvania, the historic area in the northwest of the country. The Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania (DSVR) is a large and influential ethnic party, a member of a number of governing coalitions.

The historical memory of Transylvania is one of the subjects of the mentioned conflict between the Hungarians and Romanians. For the former, this region has long remained the sole focus of Hungarian culture and nationhood in Europe. For the second, by contrast, the incorporation of Transylvania in December 1918 into Romania was the final stage in the "harvesting" of historic Romanian lands. In this regard, an important memorial site for Romanians is the World War I military cemeteries located on the slopes of the Carpathians (the Hungarians fought against Romania in the Austrian army at that time). In Romanian school textbooks, entire sections of the history of Hungarian Transylvania were omitted, the role of the Transylvanian princes was diminished or ignored, and Hungarian names were Romanized [6, p. 85]. In the text of the national anthem of Romania, Matthias Corvin, the king of Hungary, who is considered as a national hero there, is called a "great ancestor" of Romanians simply because he was of Transylvanian descent.

Contradictions between Hungarians and Romanians are also evident in subjects that are more mundane. The situation with the University of Cluj may be most telling. For a long time it was the intellectual center of the Hungarians of Transylvania. Under the Romanian Constitution, persons belonging to national minorities are guaranteed the right to learn their mother tongue and to be educated in that language, mentioned in Part 1, Art. 32. Hungarian students may indeed request the organization of Hungarian language classes, but this is a monolingual university.

According to experts, for the Hungarians it is more than a question of their rights, it is “a means of cultural survival and recognition of the intellectual component of the Hungarian community”. For Romanians, this is the first step towards ethnic separation and, ultimately, a threat to the territorial integrity of the state [7, p. 257].

During the lengthy discussions surrounding the possible resolution of the Hungarian issue in Romania, the Hungarian community was divided into moderates and radicals. The first, supporters of the DWR, proposed to create autonomy modeled after South Tyrol in Italy. The radically tuned part of the Hungarians, considering Transylvania “their” ancestral territory, insisted on recognizing them as the country’s second constructing ethnic group. Back in 2003, the Transylvanian Hungarian National Council was formed, which opposed the leadership of the DWRC to promote the idea of autonomy. In 2008, after Romania joined the European Union, the Hungarian Civic Party attempted to arrange European agreements, according to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the Charter of Regional Languages. A year later, in 2009, an unrecognized territorial entity in Transylvania was known as the Sekai Territory.

As far as you can see, Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania have so far managed to maintain a balance in their relations with each other. On the one hand, the long tradition of living together in one area plays a positive role here. On the other hand, there is some potential for constructing a common cultural memory in the socialist past of the country. In this regard, one can recall the memorial to the victims of the 1989 revolution that overthrew the Ceausescu regime as it is well known, it started in the Hungarian regions of Romania). In addition, Romania, together with Hungary and a number of other post-socialist countries, has joined the pan-European ATRIUM project aimed at identifying, exploring, and safeguarding the legacy of totalitarian regimes.

To reduce the potential for a likely conflict in Transylvania, the Romanian leadership has taken a number of measures. The first and most important laws were the Election Law passed in 1992 and the Education Act passed in 1995. Both of these laws were in line with the European Framework Convention. Since 1996, Hungarians have been represented in the Romanian Parliament for the first time in history; the network of secondary schools for Hungarian children was expanded, university colleges were established for teaching Hungarian and new textbooks were prepared. The Romanian Constitution contains a separate article. It is the Art. 6, parag. 1-2, which stated that “the state recognizes and guarantees to persons, belonging to national minorities the right to preserve, to develop and display their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity. The protection measures taken by the State to

preserve, develop and display the identity of persons, belonging to national minorities, must comply with the principles of equality and non-discrimination against other Romanian citizens”.

Since 2001, the Department of Interethnic Relations has been operating in Romania, replacing it in the Council on Minority Affairs, which emerged in 1993. It operates as a unit of government designed to assist national minorities, promote dialogue within ethnic programs, and engage with organizations that support the ideas and goals of international relations. Ongoing work involves promoting the Hungarian cultural and information space (7 theaters, more than 20 radio stations and television programs, more than 100 newspapers and magazines), a network of non-governmental organizations to support Hungarian cultural identity.

Gypsy issues are a major topic in the topic of national minorities. Gypsies can be considered the second largest ethnic minority in Romania after the Hungarians, and their exact numbers cannot be determined for a number of reasons: experts call figures from 0.5 to 1.3 million, i.e. 2.5 to 6.5% of population. Representatives of this minority live by their domestic laws, more than half of Roma do not have formal work. The majority of them, approximately 58% of men, and 89 % of women have no education. In addition, here the main problem of the Gypsy community is their isolation from the rest of society. Attempts to socialize the Roma were made in due time by a special subcommittee of the Interagency Committee on National Minorities. However, as in the Hungarian case, this process has been met with rejection by the locals – both Romanians and Hungarians who do not regard the Gypsies as “their own”, even if the latter have already adopted the relevant culture and language.

The role of World War II in the politics of historical memory and the symbolic politics of the CEE countries

One of the major milestones in the historical memory of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is the memory of World War II, so the role of World War II in memory and symbolic politics should be considered separately. This discourse differs substantially from similar discourse in Ukraine and many other post-Soviet countries. If we to talk about the call to “remember not to repeat” in the case of Ukraine, the CEE countries that have become new members of the EU. World War II is now regarded more as a turning point, which resulted in them between the two dictatorships. The Nazi and the Soviet consistently were dependent on one or the other. In this respect, the pursuit of memory and identity politics is closely linked to pan-European identity politics in terms of condemning the totalitarian past and distancing itself from its inheritance, regardless of political orientation and regardless of the real consequences for a European regime.

In the case of the countries concerned such as Romania and Hungary, the situation is complicated by the fact that Romania until September 1944 and Hungary until the spring of 1945 fought on the side of Nazi Germany. This obviously complicates the formulation of a commemoration strategy for these historical events. The pan-European discourse mentioned above has a significant impact here. Thus, in the case of Romania, the emphasis is not on the events of the war, but on the country's transition to the anti-Hitler coalition, in close connection with the overthrow of the dictatorship of I. Antonescu. According to this plot joins the following, related to the condemnation of the already communist regime [8]. It is no coincidence that two government commissions consistently worked in Romania – one of the country's participation in the Holocaust (2003–2004) (followed by apologies at the presidential level) and the other of the Communist Heritage Study (2006).

However, the events of 1941–1944 in Romania are not hidden. Thus, part of the bilateral Ukrainian-Romanian contacts is the perpetuation of the memory of Romanian prisoners of war who died on the territory of the USSR, as well as inter-archival cooperation in identifying and publishing documents related to these subjects. In Romania, after 1989, a number of pieces of legislation were passed that prohibited the glorification of Prime Minister I. Antonescu's collaborator with Hitler's Germany, as well as the far-right nationalist organization, the Iron Guard. In Romania, they claimed responsibility for the extermination of Jews and Gypsies during World War II under EU pressure, though.

Perhaps, the most notable case in point is Hungary's case. As already mentioned, during 1941–1944 Hungary actively fought on the side of Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union, and in the last year of its participation in the war (from March 1944 to April 1945) Hungary was occupied by German troops. In Hungary, the concept of “transition from one stage of totalitarianism to another” is most widely used in memory and historical politics. The House of Terror operates in Budapest. There are no analogues in Romania and other countries in the region. In mind of the Hungarian population, the image of Hungary as a victim of Hitler and then of Stalin advances is promoted. The 1956 uprising also holds an important place in memory politics and is memorialized at the state level on holiday in October 23.

Thus, the Second World War and the interpretation of its events and consequences play an important role in the politics of memory and in the symbolic politics of the CEE countries. The pan-European concept of “condemnation of two totalitarianisms” is actively used, and there is a tendency for their evaluation as “equal evils”. At the same time, unlike neighboring Poland, the idea of “victimization”, the representation of one's country as a completely innocent victim in

Romania and Hungary, is not so widespread, though in Hungary this idea is noticeable. The most balanced memory policy and symbolic policy associated with World War II is in today's Romania, to a much lesser extent, in present-day Hungary.

Conclusions

One of the important conclusions to be drawn from the comparative analysis of the cases of Hungary and Romania is that in all these cases there is a marked discrepancy between the legal norms adopted and declared at the level of supranational structures of the EU and the actual practice of treating national minorities in politics. Memory and identity policies in each of the CEE countries examined. The main problem here is the serious differences between the ethnic and political situation in the countries of Western Europe, on the one hand, and in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, on the other. These differences are due not only to different histories, but also to the different socio-economic and geopolitical positions of Western and Central-Eastern European societies. The formation of the nation and the state proceeded more or less simultaneously and interconnected in the countries of Western Europe. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe national building in many cases either lagged behind the formation of the state and its institutions, or occurred with numerous deviations caused by influence as internal, and foreign policy factors. At the same time, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary, Romania, throughout their history were members of various state formations and political alliances, gained state independence much later than the countries of Western Europe. Moreover, even after gaining formal political independence, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the XX century repeatedly transitioned from one international political and military union to another. It happened de facto, being not only subjects of world politics, but also the objects of politics of the great powers. In addition, the level of economic and social development of CEE countries has been and it remains substantially lower than in Western Europe. Hence the numerous obstacles to the formation of a modern state and a civic nation, the presence of many ethno-linguistic and territorial communities, national minorities, which are poorly integrated, apart from the “titular nation”.

In this regard, supranational norms and practices adopted in the European Union are often at odds with the actual, historically established norms and practices that exist in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, have recently joined the EU. As already noted, each of the CEE countries under consideration has its own interpretation and implementation of EU rules. In this case, the experience of CEE countries is quite illustrative and significant for Ukraine

and other CIS countries. The desire to “enter Europe” dominated by traditions, norms, and institutions that do not fit into current EU practice leads, at best, to the divergence of theoretically accepted European legal norms and real political practice, and in the worst case contributes to socio-economic and political stagnation, depression, increased social inequality, low efficiency of both borrowed and traditional institutions and practices. The policy on national minorities in Hungary and Romania, despite their formal application of the provisions of the pan-European Framework Convention, differs significantly. The most effective national minority policy in Romania, which in reality seeks to enforce minority rights, rather than simply harmonizing state law with pan-European ones. In Hungary, this policy is less effective. In Hungary, it is mostly implemented in the form of declarations and legislation without practically filling them, with Hungarian nationalism clearly presenting the ethnic nationalism used by the state in the name of the ruling Fidesz's party. Differences in policies towards national minorities can be seen from the example of Roma: in general, their situation in Romania, despite the existing problems, is more favorable than in Hungary, they are less segregated and more involved in public life.

At the same time, as the comparative analysis of the two CEE countries shows, memory and identity policies in Hungary are most effective. This is due to the fact that Hungary, on the one hand, is a mono-ethnic country. It facilitates the consolidation of the nation and the formation of a unified national identity. On the other hand, the fact that the state's policies in the field of national and identity policies in the mental and socio-economic the plans are largely in line with the sentiment of the majority of the population.

Less effective is the memory and identity policy in Romania, which is characterized by the poly-ethnic nature and the presence of politically mobilized minority groups that carry out their own memory and identity policies. In addition, the majority of the Romanian population as a whole is quite passive in taking action in this area, since the interests of this majority are usually limited; they are mainly related to the socio-economic status of particular groups and to the life of ethno-territorial communities. The situation in the field of national and identity policies in CEE countries is also complicated by the fact that there are different actors in this field.

In addition to nation-states and EU structures (European Council, European Commission, European Parliament, etc.) In Hungary and Romania, structures such as the Open Society Institute of J. Soros, Freedom House, Transparency International, and others are quite active. International and local, but funded from abroad by non-governmental organizations as well as interest groups and lobbyists from other countries. All these actors have different interests and often do

not overlap with the national interests of the CEE countries concerned. This leads, in particular, to conflicts of interest, such as the conflict between the Hungarian government and the Open Society Institute, and appearances in Hungary and Romania against J. Soros-funded NGOs [9].

Thus, the practices of regulating ethnic and political processes in Hungary and Romania differ substantially, and these differences, despite the fact that these countries are members of the EU, do not diminish, but rather increase, as well as differences between CEE countries, on the one hand, and Western countries such as Europe, on the other. The most serious ethnic and political contradictions exist between the Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania, although these contradictions are subject to effective regulation by the Romanian state and society. In addition, ethnic and political contradictions related to the situation of the Roma are common to the countries under consideration as is the case with most EU countries. Overall, given the low pace of modernization of society and the state in Romania and Hungary, as well as the difficult socio-economic situation, one can predict the exacerbation of ethnic and political contradictions and conflicts in these countries, which require the development of new regulatory practices at supranational pan-European level and at the levels of individual states.

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Особливості впровадження політики ідентичності в урегулюванні етнополітичних процесів у Центральній і Східній Європі (приклад Угорщини та Румунії)

Бекдамірова Лідія Заурівна

аспірант кафедри загальноправових та політичних наук
Національного університету
«Запорізька політехніка»
вул. Жуковського, 64,
Запоріжжя, Україна

Досвід країн Центральної та Східної Європи у регулюванні етнополітичних процесів та конфліктів має важливе значення як із погляду визначення перспектив розвитку цих країн, так і з погляду критичного осмислення і використання досвіду Україною та іншими пострадянськими країнами. Варто одразу зазначити, що не весь розглянутий досвід країн Центральної та Східної Європи є позитивним і не всі методи регулювання етнополітичних процесів можна адаптувати до умов України. Тим не менш, деякі підходи та практики, включаючи певні елементи політики ідентичності, політики у відношенні національних меншин, політики пам'яті, мови, символічної політики з певними кореляціями та змінами можуть бути використані і в нашій країні. Окрім того, Україні при здійсненні своєї зовнішньої політики необхідно звертати увагу на особливості політики ідентичності та політики пам'яті, яка реалізується у країнах Центральної та Східної Європи, оскільки ці особливості значно впливають на внутрішню та зовнішню політику цих країн, в т. ч. на відносини між кожною з цих держав та Україною.

У статті розглядається досвід регулювання етнополітичних процесів на прикладі двох країн Центральної та Східної Європи – Угорщини та Румунії. Вибір саме цієї країни пов'язаний передусім із тим, що ці постсоціалістичні країни, які відносно нещодавно стали країнами ЄС, представляє різноманітні за своїм характером та в відомому сенсі типологічні приклади здійснення країнами Центральної та Східної Європи політики ідентичності, пам'яті, мови, символічної політики та політики по відношенню до національних меншин.

Кожна з розглянутих країн має свою власну, яскраво виражену специфіку в галузі міжнародних відносин, причому ця специфіка значно відрізняє їх від країн Західної Європи. Водночас, незважаючи на суттєві відмінності в регулюванні етнополітичних та етносоціальних процесів, деякі напрямки націєбудування та політики ідентичності в них мають схожу траєкторію. У зв'язку з цим має сенс охарактеризувати особливості етнополітичних процесів націєбудування, політики ідентичності та політики щодо національних меншин в Угорщині та Румунії, проаналізувати роль Другої світової війни в політиці історичної пам'яті та символічній політиці країн ЦСЄ.

Ключові слова: політика ідентичності, етнічні та політичні процеси, міжнародні відносини, створення нації, етнічні та політичні суперечності.