

РОЗДІЛ 4. ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНИХ СИСТЕМ ТА ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО РОЗВИТКУ

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The importance of the Azerbaijani-Turkish model of energy security for Europe

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The purpose of the article is to analyze the Azerbaijani-Turkish model of energy security in terms of the European Union's contribution to energy security. The analysis mainly covers the period after the 2000s.

Methodology and methods used. The article analyzes and summarizes the main principles of the European Union's energy security, the role of Azerbaijan's energy resources in this security, as well as the importance of the Azerbaijani-Turkish model of energy security for European countries. The article uses maps and tables to support the hypotheses. The article uses maps and tables to support the hypotheses.

The main scientific innovation. The article is based on the fact that Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation is a unique model in terms of energy security, the main feature of which is that it is effective not only for the two countries, but also for other partners and is constantly evolving. The fact that the European Union countries are at the forefront of the countries that benefit most from the Azerbaijani-Turkish energy security model is based on facts.

The results of the study. The result. The results of the study are as follows:

- Covers three principles of energy security in Western Europe – security, accessibility and regularity;
- Recently, energy security issues have become even more important for EU countries. Russia's attempts to use natural gas as a means of pressure in foreign policy are forcing the European Union to diversify its energy resources and transportation routes, and to prioritize crisis management;
- EU countries have launched various projects to address their growing energy needs, while eliminating their dependence on traditional foreign energy sources. In this regard, the role of Azerbaijan, an energy producer and a transit company, as well as Turkey, which is almost the only profitable transit role in the delivery of Central Asian and Azerbaijani energy resources to Europe, has increased significantly;
- Azerbaijan not only had rich energy resources, but is also considered the «gateway» to the most optimal transit route for the delivery of Central Asian energy resources to the European Union, bypassing Russia.

Key words: Energy Security, European Union, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Energy Corridor.

Introduction (problem statement). Although there are different approaches to this issue within the European Union, which has its own policy in the field of energy security, efforts are being made to build a common energy security sensitivity within the union. The European Commission said that the demand for energy could not be fully met by members' natural resources, and that this would lead to serious shortages in the future in the field of energy supply.

The uninterrupted supply of existing energy resources to the EU requires that the Union strengthen its relations with Russia, Algeria, the Middle East and the Caspian Basin, which have rich energy resources. It also has certain responsibilities in resolving existing and future conflicts in these areas. Russia's attempts to use natural gas as a tool of pressure in foreign policy have forced the EU to diversify its energy resources and transportation routes, and to prioritize crisis management.

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In recent years, publications on the subject have provided a comprehensive analysis of the subject. In Western Europe, energy security is based on three principles: security, accessibility and sustainability [1, p. 76–77].

All these principles form the basis of the EU's geostrategic policy on energy security in the face of growing energy needs in the future. All these principles form the basis of the EU's geostrategic policy on energy security in the face of growing energy needs in the future. Recently, energy security issues

have become even more important for EU countries. This is due to the following reasons:

The first is the strained relations with Russia, one of the EU's main gas exporters, and Russia's rise in prices for exported natural gas, leading to energy problems in the EU. It is true that the project to build a gas pipeline with Russia on the "North Stream-2" project is being implemented. However, political and economic tensions between the EU and Russia inevitably force the Union to turn to alternative energy sources [2].

It is clear that Russia is resorting to «protection» methods, one of which is the creation of various barriers to energy exports to Europe, that is, the use of the energy factor for political purposes, in the language of the EU. It should also be noted that Russia, as one of the main exporters of gas to the EU, in 2018 will send \$ 150 billion to the Union. m3 of natural gas. Despite tensions in EU-Russia relations in 2020, there has been no reduction in the amount of gas imported from Russia [3]. This factor urges the EU to be more careful in its relations with Russia, as well as to look for alternative energy projects that bypass Russia.

Second, despite the active implementation of renewable energy projects in Western Europe, and especially the «green energy» project, the Union's demand for natural gas and oil will increase in the next decade, according to leading experts from EU countries. Faced with this fact, EU countries are turning to alternative energy sources [2].

Third, while the growing volume of industrial and economic development in the EU has led to an increase in demand for new energy sources, on the other hand, the fact that energy is cheaper and more accessible is also an important issue. Currently, the EU's main energy importers are Russia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and the United States. However, these countries also have various problems with energy sales. In addition, the EU is self-sufficient in gas from Britain's North Sea resources, as well as the gas reserves of some other countries [4].

Fourth is the emergence of large gas importers in the markets, such as China, India and other industrial giants of Southeast Asia. These countries offer more favorable conditions for energy exporters than EU countries. Such a factor is pushing a number of leading energy exporters to gradually shift to the Asian market. Thus, in 2014, Russia's Gazprom and China's CNPC signed a 30-year gas export agreement. The agreement led to the realization of a new large gas pipeline project called «Siberian Power». Another factor that increased the urgency of the project was the sanctions imposed on Russia by EU countries and the United States. The length of the pipeline is 3,000 km, and the export capacity is 38 billion. m3. This is the first major gas pipeline project connecting the Chinese and Russian markets [5]. India is the second largest industrial

exporter of energy in Asia. India is also the world's fourth largest energy importer. Although India produces gas and oil, the country meets 80% of its energy needs through imports. The main exporter of gas to the country is Gatar (80%). India's energy demand is projected to increase by 5% next year, which is a very large figure. That is why it was planned to implement two major projects – TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) and Peace (Iran-Pakistan-India). However, the contradictions between these states did not allow the implementation of projects [5].

Finally, the escalation of political conflicts in the Middle East; This is one of the reasons why EU countries are looking for new energy sources. In this regard, the importance of energy resources for the EU in the Caucasus, as well as in Central Asia, is growing.

Formation of the Azerbaijan-Turkey model of energy security. It is important to note the growing importance of Turkey as an important transit route for gas and oil exports to the EU.

EU countries have embarked on a variety of projects to address their growing energy needs while eliminating their dependence on traditional foreign energy sources. In this regard, the role of Azerbaijan, an energy producer and transit company, as well as Turkey, which is almost the only profitable transit role in the delivery of Central Asian and Azerbaijani energy resources to Europe, has significantly increased.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the first energy export project for the EU in which Azerbaijan and Turkey will jointly participate was the NABUCCO project. The project was launched in 2002 by Turkey's BOTAS and Austria's OMV. The project envisages the delivery of natural gas reserves of Iran and Central Asia to Europe via Azerbaijan and Turkey. The NABUCCO project would have a length of 3,300 km and a gas transmission capacity of about 30 billion meters³ per year. The project was to cost about \$ 15 billion [6, p. 247].

NABUCCO was to include the Shah Deniz field with reserves of about 1.5 trillion m³, and the Dovletabad and South Yolotan-Osman fields belonging to Turkmenistan [6, p. 247].

However, this project has caused a great deal of controversy since its inception, and has been attempted to be neglected by alternative projects. For example, as an alternative to NABUCCO, BP has proposed another gas pipeline project, the South East Gas Pipeline (SEEL). The political and financial problems that have arisen have gradually reduced the likelihood of the NABUCCO project becoming a reality. As a result, the construction of this gas pipeline, scheduled for commissioning in 2014, did not take place.

As noted above, there have been some obstacles to the implementation of the NABUCCO pipeline. The first was that the construction of the pipeline would

be extremely expensive. For comparison, the current TANAP project has repeatedly cost less than NABUCCO (about \$ 7 billion) [7, p. 130]. This made the implementation of the project a problem in terms of economic efficiency. Second, Russia, which sees NABUCCO as a rival to its economic interests, signed the Turkish Stream project with Turkey in October 2016 and implemented the project in January 2020. The capacity of the project is about 32 billion m³. The peculiarity of the project was that the gas was pumped over a distance of 980 km without a compressor. This significantly reduces gas export costs. Russia also offered SOCAR to participate in the Blue Stream project. However, Azerbaijan preferred the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline project [6, p. 249].

Failure to negotiate on the NABUCCO project did not mean that the EU countries refused to cooperate with Azerbaijan. On the other hand, starting from 2014, Azerbaijan started to supply Turkey with natural gas. This meant that despite the failure of the first project, the issue of transporting Azerbaijani gas from the EU to Europe via Turkey was still relevant. That is why the AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnection) project was launched to bring Azerbaijani gas to the Black Sea via Georgia, from there to Romania in liquid form (compressed), and then back to Europe in gas form. On April 13, 2010, a memorandum on cooperation in compressed natural gas and its transportation was signed between Romania, Azerbaijan and Georgia in Bucharest. On May 12, 2010, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on the establishment of a joint venture to implement the project [8]. According to the project, initially 2 billion m³ of compressed gas will be transported to Europe, and then the plant's capacity will be increased to 20 billion m³ per year. On September 14, 2010, Baku adopted the Baku Declaration between Azerbaijan, Romania, Georgia and Hungary, which was a political support for the project [9]. However, this project was also incomplete. The main reason for the project's failure was very simple: Limited financial resources of Baku's project partners. This showed that the project is expensive. There were also political reasons for the failure of the project. These included the fact that transport will pass through the territories of Abkhazia and Moldova. This was unacceptable for Romania and Georgia. On the other hand, the discussion of the project came at a time of strained political relations between Russia and Turkey. Therefore, Turkey did not support the project. As a result, the project did not materialize [10].

All the above processes show that the Turkish-Azerbaijani model in energy security is important both in terms of ensuring the energy security of the European Union, as well as in terms of future cooperation and integration of both countries.

In 2004, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on South Caucasus Gas Transport. Most scientific sources refer to this agreement as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline project. The length of the gas pipeline under the project will be 970 km, and the gas extracted from the Shah Deniz-1 field will be transported from the Sangachal terminal to the Turkish city of Erzurum. The project will not be limited to this, in the future the pipeline would run through Turkey to the depths of Europe [11]. Unlike NABUCCO, BTE and TAP were also cost-effective projects.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline was commissioned on December 15, 2006. Initially, gas was transported to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and in July 2007 to Turkey. The official opening of the pipeline took place on March 25, 2007. In 2017, the capacity of the pipeline was increased to 20 billion m³ (Neftegaz.ru, 2014). The shareholders of the project are BP – 28.8%, AzSCP – 10.0%, TPAO – 19%, Petronas – 15.5%, LUKOIL – 10%, NICO – 10%, SGC Midstream – 6.7%. The pipeline was built by the South Caucasus Pipeline Company (SCPC). In fact, the realization of this project was just a preamble to the Azerbaijani-Turkish model of energy cooperation.

In July 2020, large gas fields were discovered in the Sakarya field on the Black Sea coast of Turkey. The field was discovered in the exploration zone called Tuna-1, 100 km off the coast of Turkey. However, according to experts, it will take at least seven years to start work on the development of the fields. The gas reserves discovered in the fields do not reduce Turkey's demand for Azerbaijani gas. It should be noted that these reserves are designed exclusively to meet Turkey's domestic needs. Because the reserves obtained there are many times lower than the gas reserves discovered in Azerbaijan [12].

In general, it should be noted that Turkey is the second largest producer of energy in the world after China. Turkey's growing economy is leading to a steady increase in the need for large energy resources. Recently, the demand of Turkish industry for natural gas continues to exceed its demand for other energy sources. Turkey is also a stable importer of gas [13, p. 101]. According to 2016 figures, Turkey is the fifth largest importer of gas in the world. Turkey, whose demand for natural gas is growing every year, is also located on one of the shortest transport routes connecting Central Asia, the Caucasus, as well as the leading energy producers in the Middle East with European countries. This geopolitical reality forms the basis of Turkey's energy policy in modern times. In fact, Turkey's energy policy can be summarized in the following points:

1. Ensuring the security of energy supply routes. This also applies to their transit;
2. Strengthening Turkey's transit role in the transportation of oil and gas resources;

3. Strengthen the role of EU member states in ensuring energy security. Partnership with Azerbaijan has a special place in this issue.

4. More use of renewable energy and nuclear energy;

5. Ensuring efficient use of energy [13, p. 103].

It should be noted that Turkey has successfully achieved these goals. At present, Turkey has signed the following projects, which are used for its domestic needs and at the same time provide energy resources to European countries through its territory and will continue to do so in the future: 1. Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline; 2. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline; Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline; 4. Interconnector Turkey-Greece (ITG) gas pipeline; 5. «Western route» gas pipeline; 6. Blue Stream gas pipeline; 7. Iran-Turkey gas pipeline; 8. TANAP gas pipeline; 9. TAP gas pipeline; 10. Turkey-Bulgaria Interconnector (ITB) gas pipeline project; 11. Turkish Stream gas pipeline.

One of the highlights of the above projects is that Turkey has signed some of these projects with its political opponents Greece and Bulgaria [13, p. 103]. This creates prospects for strengthening Turkey's geopolitical position in the Balkans. In addition, these energy projects help Turkey to be quite independent in its relations with NATO partners, and to more consistently defend its political and strategic interests. Interestingly, Turkey's energy cooperation with Russia has forced EU countries to reconsider their energy security strategies. They have begun to take concrete steps in this area. The first of these was the memorandum on the unification of the countries of the Union in the «Energy Union» in March 2015 [14, p. 81]. The reasons for this memorandum are Russia's relations with Ukraine and the Crimean issue. Russia's use of the energy factor as a means of pressure on the Union countries was also a determining factor in the adoption of this memorandum. This attitude of Russia has forced European countries not only to look for alternative energy resources, but also to reshape relations with countries that have energy resources and play a transit role in energy supply routes.

Conclusions. Therefore, the EU countries began to talk to Turkey in a «different language», so to speak. In addition, the European Union has begun talking about the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project, and since 2015 has begun talks with Azerbaijan, as well as Turkmenistan, another country with rich gas reserves. However, at the 2019 Caspian Summit in Turkmenistan, the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project was met with protests from Russia and Iran. That is why Azerbaijan began to approach the project with caution. However, the issue of providing the European Union with energy resources that do not include Russia and Iran and will be transported via Turkey and Azerbaijan remains relevant.

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Значення азербайджано-турецької моделі енергетичної безпеки для Європи

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Мета статті – оцінка резолюцій турецько-турецької моделі енергетичної безпеки з погляду вкладу Європейського Союзу в енергетичну безпеку. Аналіз в основі обґрунтування періоду після 2000-х років.

Використовувані методика та методи. У статті аналізуються та узагальнюються основні засади регіональної безпеки Європейського Союзу, роль енергоресурсів Азербайджану у цій безпеці, а також Азербайджансько-турецькій моделі енергетичної безпеки для європейських країн. У статті використовуйте карти та таблиці для підтвердження гіпотези. У статті використовуйте карти та таблиці для підтвердження гіпотези.

Головне наукове нововведення. Стаття про те, що судово-турецька співпраця є унікальною моделлю з погляду енергетичної безпеки, головна особливість якої полягає в тому, що вона є ефективною не тільки для двох країн, але й для інших партнерів і постійно розвивається. Той факт, що країни використовують у перших рядах країн, які найбільше виграють від швейцарсько-турецької моделі енергетичної безпеки, ґрунтуються на фактах.

Результати дослідження. Результат. Результати дослідження можливі:

- охоплює три сектори світової безпеки в Європі – безпеку, доступність та спостережуваність;
- Останнім часом питання енергетичної безпеки стали ще важливішими для країн ЄС. Спроби Росії використовувати наявний газ як засіб тиску у зовнішній політиці змушують Європейський Союз диверсифікувати свої ресурси та транспортні маршрути та скласти пріоритетну увагу управлінню кризою;
- Країни ЄС запустили кілька проектів для своїх компаній, що ростуть у галузі енергетики, виключивши цю залежність від іноземних джерел енергії. У зв'язку з цим значно зростає роль виробника енергоресурсів та транзитної компанії, а також Туреччини, яка є чи не єдиною прибутковою транзитною роллю у доставці середньоазіатських та палестинських енергоресурсів до Європи;
- Азербайджан володіє не тільки багатими енергоресурсами, а й вважається «воротами» до найпопулярнішого транзитного маршруту доставки центрально-азіатських енергоресурсів в обхід Росії.

Ключові слова: енергетична безпека, Європейський Союз, Азербайджан, Туреччина, енергетичний коридор.